Abstract. We present a novel approach to deal with transitivity permissiondelegation threats that arise in social networks when content is granted permissions by third-party users thereby breaking the privacy policy of the content owner. These types of privacy breaches are often unintentional in social networks like Facebook, and hence, (more) in-place mechanisms are needed to make social network users aware of the consequences of changing their privacy policies. Our approach is unique in its use of formal methods tools and techniques. It builds on a predicate logic definition for social networking that caters for common aspects of existing social networks such as users, social network content, friendship, permissions over content, and content transmission. Our approach is implemented in Yices. For the predicate logic model, we formulate a security policy for the verification of the permission flow of content owned by social network users, and demonstrate how this security policy can be verified.
Introduction
With the advent of the Internet and social media, the ever increasing number of users of social networking sites, the privacy of social network content people share has become of utmost importance. In recent years, online social network services in the form of websites such as Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, and Hi5, have become popular tools to allow users to publish content, share common interests and keep up with their friends, family and business connections. Facebook, currently the dominant service, reports 250 million active user accounts, roughly half of which include daily activity. Users of social networks often share private content with multiple groups and people they do not even know in real life. A typical social network user-profile features personal information (such as gender, birthday, family situation), a continuous stream of activity from actions taken on the social network site (such as message sent, status update, games played) and media content (such as photos and video, and personal comments). The privacy of this information is a significant concern [GA05] , for example, users may upload media they wish to share with specific friends, but do not wish to be widely distributed to their network as a whole. Furthermore, the personal information users post can be used for password breaking or phishing attacks [JJJM07] . Access control to social profiles content is, therefore, an important issue.
Social network services have conflicting goals. Although respecting the privacy of their client base is important, they must also grow and expand the connections between users in order to be successful. This is typically achieved by exposing content to users through links such as friends-of-friends, in which content relating to individuals known to a user's friend (but not the user) is revealed. Examples of this behavior include gaining access to a photo album of an unknown user simply because a friend is tagged in one of the images. Backdoors also exist to facilitate casual connections such as allowing an unknown user to gain access to profile information simply by replying to a message he or she has sent. APIs are simple to develop and can easily gain access to much of a user's profile information. Backdoors have conflicting goals with social networking sites. A current trend to open APIs to third party developers has exacerbated these issues [FE08] . Hence, although respecting the privacy policies of social network sites is important, third-party APIs must also expand connections among users in order to be successful. This is achieved by allowing users to connect over common interests by exposing their content through less restrictive policies.
Social-networking sites are constantly evolving and changing by keeping up with user's demand for additional functionality. This constant change leaves users in the dark as to how the social networking site handles their content and the consequences of their actions. The consequences of user actions refer to the access privileges granted to other users as a result of those actions. Social networking sites provide users with the ability to specify their privacy policies but these are not always effective or are not always applied. The inadequacy of privacy policies stems from the fact that users find stipulating detailed privacy settings to be challenging [BAC09] . Additionally, it is not always possible to trust the social-networking site to uphold user's policies as became evident from Facebook privacy breaches in 2009 [Facte] , when Facebook changed its privacy policies without informing its users, resulting in content from private groups, user-defined friend groups, and user content, being made public. Therefore, the users require a user-friendly mechanism that informs them of the consequences of their actions, allowing them to make informed decisions.
Privacy means something different to everyone. Based on the diverse types of privacy rights and violations, it is evident that technology has a dual role in privacy: new technologies give rise to new threats to privacy rights, but, at the same time, they can help to preserve privacy [TW09] . Formal Methods (FM) provides a mechanism to model the functionality of Social Networking Sites (SNS) allowing a user to reason about the consequences of their actions in terms of the set of access privileges granted over some content. This paper presents a novel approach for modeling and checking social-network privacy policies to deal with transitivity permission-delegation threats. Our work differs from existing approaches in its use of FM to deal with the threats. Our work builds on a predicate logic definition of Social Networks (SN) in Event-B [Abr10] . We use predicate logic to model SN, SN content, SN users, and privacy policies. The verification of privacy breaches is entirely performed in Yices, for which we have written a prelude library for basic Event-B structures like sets and relations, and we have encoded basic SN operations such as publishing content, uploading content, commenting on content, deleting content, creating user accounts, and creating privacy policies, which are crucial for modeling privacy policies. Although the verification of privacy breaches is entirely done in Yices, we decided to model SNS in logic first as to undertake a sanity check of our understanding of the model in Rodin [ABH + 10], a platform that provides support to Event-B, and then manually port the predicate logic definition of SNS into Yices.
The contributions of this work are three-fold. (i.) We present a logical framework for checking transitivity permission-delegation threats that arise within a SNS when access permissions are granted over network content that does not respect the privacy policy defined over that content. For example, User A (the Primary User) sets his privacy policy to allow only his friends to see some specific content. User B, a friend of User A, comment on that content and sets his personal privacy policy to allow his friends to view the comment. As per the design of most SNS like Facebook, User B's action of commenting results in the comment along with the original content being shared with all his friends. Therefore, the original content is shared with a set of users that were not stipulated by User A and who are none of his friends, thereby, breaching User A's privacy policy. Our work on permission delegation threats originated from the predicate logic definition for social networking introduced in [CR10], which we extend here to model privacy policies through an access control mechanism over lists of users. (ii.) We encode our logical framework for social networking in the input language of Yices and use Yices' solver [Dut14] to check for privacy breaches. We have found Yices to be a performant tool, and its language to be expressive enough to model all our logical definitions for SNS as well as to verify transitivity permission-delegation threats. (iii.) We formulate a security policy for SNS and provide a mechanism for verifying non-interference [GM82] of the social networking actions performed by a user with respect to the observations registered by another user. Our security policy addresses the problem of permission flow of content owned by social network users.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces Yices and the Event-B formal methodology. Section 3 discusses the different types of privacy breaches of SNS that we have considered. Section 4 presents our logical framework for social networking. Section 5 shows how our model for SNS is encoded in Yices and how the verification of privacy breaches is performed with the Yices solver. Section 6 complements Section 5 with the addition of verification conditions for the use of policy instructions. Section 7 presents our framework for checking non-interference. Section 8 discusses related work and Section 9 concludes and mentions some future plans.
Preliminaries

The Yices SMT Solver
Recent breakthroughs in boolean satisfiability (SAT) solving have enabled new approaches to software verification. SAT solvers can handle problems with millions of clauses and variables that are encountered in varied domains. Satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) generalize SAT by adding a number of useful first-order theories such as those related to equality reasoning and arithmetic. An SMT solver is a tool for deciding the satisfiability of formulas in these theories. SMT solvers enable application of bounded model checking to infinite systems. Yices [Dut14] is an SMT solver developed by SRI that decides the satisfiability of arbitrary formulas containing uninterrupted function symbols with equality, linear real and integer arithmetic, scalar types, recursive data types, tuples, records, extensional arrays, fixed-size bit-vectors, quantifiers, and lambda expressions. The SAT solving algorithm used in Yices is a modern variant of Davis-Putnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL). SMT-LIB Benchmarks and Yices together are used as the theorem prover for our proof verifier. We have use Yices to encode our definition of Social Networking Sites (SNS) that was originally presented in [CR10] . This
The Yices tool is an SMT solver developed at SRI International. It provides support for checking satisfiability of formulae containing uninterpreted function symbols with equality, linear real and integer arithmetic, bit-vectors, arrays, recursive data-types, universal and existential quantifiers, lambda expressions, tuples, and records. Hence, given a model in Yices, the solver returns "sat", "unsat", or "unknown" when some analyzed formula or model is satisfiable, unsatisfiable, or when it cannot decide, respectively.
The example below introduces a function foo in Yices. The symbol :: introduces a type definition, so foo is a lambda function that takes an integer element y and returns its successor. Variable x is declared and equalized to function foo applied to 1. The check instruction checks whether a valuation for x exists that equals foo evaluated in 1. The Yices model is therefore satisfiable (by taking x equals to 2).
(define foo :: (-> int int)) (assert (= foo (lambda (y::int) (+ y 1)))) (define x :: int) (assert (= (foo 1) x)) (check)
Event-B
Event-B is a formal modeling language for reactive systems that allows the modeling of software and hardware systems [Abr10] altogether. It is based on Action Systems [BS91], a formalism describing the behavior of a system by the atomic actions that the system carries out. An Action System describes the state space of a system and the possible actions that can be executed in it. Event-B models are composed of contexts and machines. Contexts define constants, uninterpreted sets and their properties expressed as axioms, while machines define variables and their properties, and state transitions expressed as events. An event is composed of a guard and an action. The guard (written between keywords where and then) represents conditions that must hold in a state for the event to trigger. The action (written between keywords then and end) computes new values for state variables, thus performing an observable state transition.
In Event-B, systems are typically modeled via a sequence of refinements. First, an abstract machine is developed and verified to satisfy whatever correctness and safety properties are desired. Refinement machines are used to add more detail to the abstract machine until the model is sufficiently concrete for hand or automated translation to code.
context snctx sets PERSON CONTENTS end machine snEvB sees snctx variables persons contents owner pages invariants @inv1 persons ⊆ PERSON @inv2 contents ⊆ CONTENTS @inv3 owner ∈ contents ։ persons @inv4 pages ∈ contents ↔ ↔ persons events event initialisation then @action1 persons := @action2 contents := @action3 owner := @action4 pages := end event upload any c pe where @guard1 c ∈ CONTENTS \ contents @guard2 pe ∈ persons then @action1 contents := contents ∪ {c} @action2 owner(c) := pe @action3 pages := pages ∪ {c → pe} end event hide any c pe where @guard1 c ∈ contents @guard2 pe ∈ persons @guard3 c → pe ∈ pages @guard4 owner(c) pe then @action1 pages := pages \ {c → pe} end end Rodin is an open-source Eclipse IDE for Event-B that provides a set of tools for working with Event-B models: an editor, a proof generator, and several provers. Rodin provides an API for the data model and persistence layer that allows plug-ins to work with Event-B components. The example in Figure 1 uses the Rodin tool notation, where predicates on different lines are implicitly conjoined and actions on different lines are executed simultaneously. The "\" symbol is used for set difference.
Privacy Policy Definition
In the context of Social Networking Sites (SNS), from a user's perspective, a privacy policy is a statement that discloses some or all of the ways a system shares and manages the user's data. Personal information can be anything that can be used to identify an individual, not limited to but including name, address, date of birth, marital status, contact information or any content shared by a user within a SNS. From the perspective of the SNS system, a privacy policy is a statement that declares a policy on how it collects, stores, and releases personal information. It tells the user what specific information is collected from him, and whether it is kept confidential or shared with partners and, if so, how.
More specifically, in the context of a SNS, privacy policies are defined on a per-user basis. A user's privacy policy defines a set of other users within the SNS, which can be granted view or edit privileges over some content. With the concept of user-defined lists proper of SNS such Facebook, a user can specify which list of users they wish to share said content with and which set of users must never be granted any privileges over the content. A user might have multiple different policies regarding content sharing, for instance, friends or acquaintances. This is due to the flexibility required within SNS when it comes to content sharing.
A look at trends in current SNS shows that a user can either use a pre-defined policy or define a new one, every time they want to share some content. For example, in Facebook, a user may add some content to the SNS and then can wish to share it. When sharing, the user's default policy is set to the policy last defined by the user, the user then either selects this policy or define a new policy on-the-fly. A new privacy policy, the policy to be checked for compliance, can thereby be defined as the consequences of any actions performed by a user within the SNS. More specifically, a policy is defined by the set of users granted privileges over some specific content.
A Policy Definition Example
Let us assume, a user has defined a privacy policy which states that when their content is shared, it must only be shared with the users in the user-defined list close-friends. To this effect the user defines an OriginalPolicy policy as shown below. In this policy, a user ow1 (called the content owner) is created with some required page content c1. User ow1 refers to the user in question who is defining their policy. Next, the policy creates list close-friends before transmitting c1 to the members of the list.
OriginalPolicy(){ create-account(ow1, c1); create-list(close-friends, ow1); transmit-to-list(c1, close-friends); } Now, another user defines CommentPolicy wherein when they comment on some content it must be shared with the user-defined list work. The comment they are sharing is linked to the existing content c1. To this effect, the policy is defined as shown below. The CommentPolicy reflects the mechanisms adopted by SNS such as Facebook for commenting on content. In this policy, user ow2 is created with some required page content c2, and ow2 refers to the user in question who is defining their policy. Next, the policy (the user ow2) creates list work before commenting on c1. The effect of commenting is as follows (the two commented lines in CommentPolicy):
-The users in list work are granted view permission (privilege) over content c1. This is implemented via the first transmit-to-list operation. -The comment cmt is also transmitted to the users in list work.
CommentPolicy(){ create-account(ow2, c2); create-list(work, ow2); comment(c1, cmt, work); // transmit-to-list(c1, work); // transmit-to-list(cmt, work); } Transitivity permission-delegation arises when third-party users are given permissions on content either inadvertently or in any case unwanted. The typical example is when I give a friend (access) permission on some of my photos and he or she comments on that photo, after which some of the my friend's friends will have access to my photos too. In our example, to identify if a transitivity permission-delegation will cause a privacy breach, we check if CommentPolicy complies with OriginalPolicy. We need to ascertain the relationship between ow1's list close-friends and ow2's list work. This relationship can manually be provided by the user or can be determined automatically from the SNS. This relationship is a subset relationship. We check whether the list of people given view permission on c1 by CommentPolicy is a subset of the list of people given view permission on c1 by OriginalPolicy. This amounts to checking whether list work is a subset of list close-friends. As this is not the case, the user is informed that a privacy breach exists, and they can decide to take an appropriate action to mitigate the breach or not.
Our policies are presented in a simplified manner for better understanding. Policies ought to include instructions to create content items and social network users. As we will see in Section 5.2 operations within a policy definition are state transformers, that is, they are parametrized by the pre-and poststate of the system. We ensure that the conditions required by the various operations are met by checking the operation preconditions, and by checking the system invariants. Only once the individual policies are deemed correct are they checked for compliance. The following are some of the features of our policy checking mechanism:
(a) Privacy policies can be compared. This confers a great level of flexibility as a new-defined policy can be checked for compatibility with respect to an old-defined policy. (b) Privacy policies can be checked for adherence to safety (invariant) properties of the SNS. This will be discussed in Section 3.2.
Policy Compliance
Our aim is to provide a mechanism for users to compare policies to check for their compliance, that is, whether a policy attests to another or not. The functionality of SNS like Facebook is often extended via the implementation of third-party plugins, which are typically granted access to user's content available throughout the SNS. On the other hand, users often change their privacy policies due to an increasing concern on the security of the data they post on the network. Based on the above there exist four major kinds of privacy breaches that a user might need to compare privacy policies for compliance to avoid:
1. SNS Privacy Breach: As a SNS evolve, its internal mechanism might change. These changes might affect how and to whom content is transmitted and the way policies are defined, thereby leaving users exposed to privacy breaches. Let us take a real-world example of Privacy Breach that occurred when
Facebook updated the format of their privacy policies [Facte] . The policy updates granted users with more control over their content, but it reset all previously defined policies to their default value, that is, public. Our approach can detect this type of breach by checking the new policy against the safety policy defined for the SNS. The old policy stipulates that a user ow can publish content to a list called friends. The new policy stipulates that the same user ow can publish to a list public that is not a subset of friends.
The two policies below show the situation of the breach. OldPolicy is the policy before the update and NewPolicy is the policy after the update.
OriginalPolicy(){ create-account(ow, rc); upload(rc, ow); create-list(friends, ow); transmit-to-list(rc, friends); } NewPolicy(){ create-account(ow, rc); upload(rc, ow) create-list(public, ow); transmit-to-list(rc, public); } 2. User Privacy Breach: Wherein a user inadvertently breaches their own privacy by not realizing that consequences of their own actions due to a lack of understanding of the internal working of the SNS. The internal working of a SNS is typically expressed as a safety policy, which refers to invariant properties of the SNS. For instance, a safety invariant policy could express that users can only edit content they can (at least) see. Let us assume, a user has created three lists within the SNS regarding the users they work with. A list of colleagues that contains users that they work with, which have the same hierarchical level (peers) within the organization, a list of superiors that contains users who are higher than the user in the organizational hierarchy (bosses), and a list of employees, which is made up of all the users in the organization. The user has defined an OldPolicy policy that states that when they share some content it must only be shared with the users in the list colleagues.
In this policy a user ow is created with some required content rc. User ow is the user in question who is defining their policy. Next, the policy adds some content to the SNS via the upload operation, allocating content ownership to ow. Then, the policy creates a list colleagues before transmitting content to the users in that list. Now, the user in question defines a NewPolicy, wherein when they share some content it must be shared with the list of employees but hidden from the list superiors. This policy might be the policy defined by the user the next time they share some content or the policy adopted by an external plug-in being used by the user. In the NewPolicy policy, first a user ow is created with some required content rc. User ow refers to the user in question who is defining their policy. Next, the policy adds some content to the SNS via the upload operation, allocating content ownership to ow. Then, the policy creates a lists employees and superiors before transmitting content to the users. Operation transmit-to-list-restricted sends content to users in the first list who are not in the second list (see Section 4.1).
OldPolicy(){ create-account(ow, rc); upload(content, ow); create-list(colleagues, ow); transmit-to-list(content, colleagues); } NewPolicy(){ create-account(ow, rc); upload(content, ow) create-list(employees, ow); create-list(superiors, ow); transmit-to-list-restricted(content, employees, superiors); } Let us assume that the SNS imposes a safety property stipulating that the list of employees is the union of the two list colleagues and superiors. As the set of access permissions allocated after the execution of NewPolicy is the same as subset of the set of access permissions granted by OldPolicy, our checking mechanism is able to inform that NewPolicy complies with OldPolicy. 3. User to User Privacy Breach: Wherein a user might unintentionally breach another user's privacy policy due either sharing that user's content or due to the automated transmission policy adopted by the SNS, for example, a comment on content can make it visible to an unintended audience. This case is explained by the example presented in Section 3.1. 4. Application Privacy Breach: A user might use an external plug-in developed by a third-party developer which might not adhere to either the user's privacy policy or the policy enforced by the SNS. Let us assume, a user has defined an OldPolicy as below, which states that when they share some content, it must only be shared with the users in the list close-friends. Next, the user uses an external (third-party) plug-in to edit content that has been previously uploaded (to the SNS) and shared. The third-party plug-in implements a NewPolicy policy as below. Edited content c is deleted by user ow and then replaced by new content.
Since the same list close-friends is used in both policies, no privacy policy breach is produced.
OldPolicy(){ create-account(ow, rc); upload(content, ow); create-list(close-friends, ow); transmit-to-list(content, close-friends); } NewPolicy(){ create-account(ow, rc); upload(content, ow) create-list(close-friends, ow); transmit-to-list(content, close-friends); edit(content, ow, new-content); } There is at present no system in place within SNS (Facebook or others) that empowers users with the ability to compare the consequences of their actions with those of a pre-existing privacy policy. In addition to this shortcoming, policy enforcement is only employed when sharing some content explicitly. The privacy issue raised by such a selective policy enforcement is, there exist other actions a user might perform which alters the set of users the said content is visible to. For instance, on Facebook, a user might tag some content thereby making it visible to all the friends of the tagged user or a comment on some content by a user might make the content visible to the user's friends. Therefore, there is a need for policy comparison and compliance every time a user performs an action that might alter the set of privileges over the content in question.
Any action or operation performed by a user, either directly within a SNS or via an external plug-in, can be considered as the definition of a new transmission privacy policy. For instance, if a user were to upload some content item rc and share it with a list of users, ListA, the policy defined would state that only the users in ListA should have view privileges and only the owner of rc must have edit privileges. Next, if a user comments on rc, the new policy would specify a list of users, ListB, who now have view privileges over the comment and the original content. It is necessary to check that the list ListB is a subset of ListA. If this is not true the action of commenting would breach the original privacy policy specified.
Checking compliance of a new policy with respect to an old policy is performed in Yices. In addition to checking compliance, we also check that operations within the policies are executable, that is, operations are called at appropriate program states. This second checking generates a series of verification conditions as described in the beginning of Section 6. The conjunction of both checkings is encoded and verified in Yices as discussed in Section 6.1.
The Logical Model for Social Networking
The checking of privacy breaches of SNS is entirely carried out in Yices. Nevertheless, there are a few good reasons for us having modeled SNS in predicate logic first and then manually ported the model into Yices. First, one can (and should) use Rodin and all of its (semi-) automatic provers to demonstrate that the logical model for SNS is consistent, and that, consequently, SN operations do not invalidate safety invariant properties. Safety invariant properties would be difficult to encode or at least to check in Yices directly. Here are two examples of invariant properties. (i.) "the owner of some data has all the permissions on it" (ii.) "users that can edit data must also be able to view it". For the former property, notice that owner is a total function from network content to the set of persons of the social network, and hence Rodin generates Proof Obligations (POs) for any operation manipulating (adding or removing) content to ensure that owner remains a total function. These POs are discharged once and forever in Rodin. Carrying out the same type of verification in Yices would highly decrease the performance of any operation about the ownership of content, and hence the performance of our checking for privacy breaches. The former property can succinctly be expressed as editp ⊆ viewp, and checking it in Yices would also negatively affect performance.
Our Event-B model for SNS encompasses the concept of privacy. Privacy issues have generated a bunch of theories and approaches, nonetheless, as stated by Anita L. Allen in [All88], "while no universally accepted definition of privacy exists, definitions in which the concept of access plays a central role have become increasingly commonplace". Following Allen's approach, our logical model of SNS encodes privacy with the aid of relations that register users' access privileges (view and edit permissions) on social-network content along with a content ownership relation (who owns what?).
Our model comprises six Event-B components (called machines): an abstract machine and five refinements. Table 1 
the network must own at least one content. owner is thus modeled as a total surjective function: owner ∈ contents ։ persons. All contents belonging to a user must reside on that user's page. This is modeled by the invariant owner ⊆ pages. Basic operations (events) at this level provide functionality for creating and deleting accounts, uploading content into a user's page, deleting (owned) or hiding (not owned) contents from a page, transmitting a content to selected users and editing/commenting contents.
The first machine refinement models access privileges. They are of two kinds, view and edit, each modeled in a separate relation: viewp ∈ contents ↔ persons and editp ∈ contents ↔ persons. These relations implement sets of content-person pairs. A pair (c,p) (written c → p in Event-B) in relation view states that person p has view privileges over content c, and similarly for relation edit. The following invariant properties of the abstract model state that, (i.) owner(c) has all privileges over content item c, (ii.) a privilege to edit a content item implies the user is allowed to see it and (iii.) a user is allowed to view all contents in his page.
owner ⊆ viewp owner ⊆ editp editp ⊆ viewp pages ⊆ viewp Our model defines operations for creating, transmitting, making visible, hiding, editing, commenting, removing and granting privileges over a raw content. All these operations, of course, are defined so as to maintain all the invariant properties. A user not owning a content can only remove it from his page.
Notice that content items are removed from all pages, and not only from the page of owner(c). Similarly, all privileges over the content are deleted. Similarly, all comments over the deleted content are removed. This is not shown here. This happens in a further machine refinement. Our model for SNS also includes an event make-visible that works in the opposite way as event hide, and comment for commenting network content. Section 7 shows a full definition of both events. 
Publishing Content
The fifth refinement deals with user lists and transmission policies. Lists control the destination of published content. A list is composed of social network users (listpe ∈ LISTS ↔ persons). A user owning a list (listow ∈ LISTS → persons) can publish content to all or selected members of the list. Privacy policies are relations among lists. A particular policy is a set of list pairs (policies ∈ dom(listow) ↔ dom(listow)) that establishes some constraints over publication of contents to members of lists in the first element of each pair with respect to members in the second elements of pairs. A disjointness policy, for instance, may constrain destinations of contents by sending it to each member of the list in some first element of the pair, provided it does not also belong to the list in the second element. A policy cannot constrain a list with itself: dom(listow) ⊳ id ∩ policies = .
A common operation to social-networking websites is publishing content to people in the network. The basic content transmission event is shown in Table 2 (ii.) whereby the owner of content c transmits it to some unspecified set of users prs. Transmission grants view permission to recipients.
Publishing can also be performed by sending contents to a list of users rather than to a single user. The two events for sending to lists of users are shown in Table 3 , each extends event transmit. Actions and guards of an extended event are (implicitly) copied into the actions and guards of the extending event, respectively. The difference between the two aforesaid events amounts to the way prs, the recipients, are instantiated: in (i.) prs is all the members of the list, whereas in (ii.) prs is restricted to members of list l1 that do not belong to list l2. Our Event-B model includes other SNS operations (not shown here) such as create-account for setting up a new account, upload for populating a user's account with new content, edit-owned and edit-not-owned for editing existing user content, comment for commenting on content, and various operations on the wall, a common concept in SNS.
The Yices Model for Social Networking
We have encoded Event-B's primary data structures in Yices, as well as the SN operations presented in Section 4. In what follows we discuss our implementation of sets (of integers) and relations (over integers) in Yices, then, we discuss the encoding of SN operations. 
Sets and Relations
Sets and relations are at the core of Event-B hence their encoding in Yices must be efficient so as to render verification practical. Table 4 shows some of the Event-B's sets and relations operations that we have implemented in Yices. We encode sets and relations as bit-vectors, which are native types in Yices. A set of integers is encoded by the type bset, defined as a bit-vector of size 8. The elements of the set are those positions with a bit equals to 1. Sets hold up to 8 elements from 0 to 7. We haven't implemented any operation recursively. First, Yices 2.5.2 offers poor support to recursion, and second, our definitions for sets and relations are bitwise rather than algebraic, so we have found bitwise manipulation of sets and relations to be simpler and faster than their recursive manipulation.
(define-type bset (bitvector 8))
Function bset-singleton builds a singleton set from an integer by using the bv-shift-left bitwise operator of Yices, thus bset-7 is built by shifting bset-0 7 times to the left. Function bset-is-subset builds on the bv-and bitvector operator to return true when s1 is a subset of s2. We have implemented in Yices all the standard set operations including unioning, intersecting, and checking membership. (if (= j 7) bset-7 bset-empty)))))))))) (define bset-is-subset::(-> bset bset bool) (lambda(s1::bset s2::bset) (= s1 (bv-and s1 s2)) ) )
A relation is encoded by the type brel and defined as a bit-vector of size 64. Our experience using Yices version 5.2.2 shows that selected size for sets and relations are big enough to verify Yices models of SNS. Relations in Event-B are encoded as a set of pairs. You can think of an object of type brel as composed of 8 objects of type bset. Each bit set to 1 in each of those objects represents an element in the range of the relation. Function brel-get-range expresses that formally. It returns the range of a relation. It extracts the 8 aforesaid objects of a relation and unions them.
Function brel-ran-restriction implements the range-restriction of a relation r with respect to a set s (see Table 4 for a formal definition of rangerestriction). It extracts the 8 objects of r, then uses the bv-and bit-vector operator to intersect each with s (to restrict the range of the relation to s), and finally uses the bv-concat bit-vector operator to form the returned relation from each intersected object.
We have implemented all the standard Event-B relation operators in Yices, including domain-restriction, domain subtraction, range-subtraction, inverse of a relation, etc. However, notice that, as in the case of brel-ran-restriction, Yices implementations do not exactly follow the formal definitions in Table 4 .
It would be impractical as definitions in the table are algebraic and our implementation uses bit-vectors instead.
(define-type brel (bitvector 64)) (define brel-get-range::(-> brel bset) (lambda(r::brel) (bset-union (bv-extract 7 0 r) (bset-union (bv-extract 15 8 r) (bset-union (bv-extract 23 16 r) (bset-union (bv-extract 31 24 r) (bset-union (bv-extract 39 32 r) (bset-union (bv-extract 47 40 r) (bset-union (bv-extract 55 48 r) (bv-extract 63 56 r) ))))))))) (define brel-ran-restriction::(-> brel bset brel) (lambda(r::brel s::bset) (bv-concat (bv-concat (bv-concat (bv-and (bv-extract 7 0 r) s) (bv-and (bv-extract 15 8 r) s) ) (bv-concat (bv-and (bv-extract 23 16 r) s) (bv-and (bv-extract 31 24 r) s) )) (bv-concat (bv-concat (bv-and (bv-extract 39 32 r) s) (bv-and (bv-extract 47 40 r) s) ) (bv-concat (bv-and (bv-extract 55 48 r) s) (bv-and (bv-extract 63 56 r) s) )) )))
Operations
Each SN operation (event) is implemented in Yices with the aid of two functions, the first function captures the semantics of the event precondition, and the second one the semantics of the event implementation. In Event-B, events are implemented through event actions that are composed of multiple assignments, and event guards play the role of the event precondition. Assignments have two parts, its left-hand side is a state variable, and its right-hand side is an expression of machine (state) variables and fresh variables introduced by the event. Events do not have an explicit notation for a variable postcondition, nevertheless, the use of a variable on the right hand-side of an assignment denotes the value of the variable in the pre-state of the event, and its use on the left hand-side of an assignment denotes its value in the poststate of the execution of the event.
The precondition function returns a boolean value (the precondition itself), and the second function is implemented as a state transformer in Yices, that is, it takes the event prestate and returns its poststate as the result of executing the events. States are implemented as tuples with an entry for each machine variable.
;;; persons contents owner pages viewp editp ;;; listpe listow policies disjointness (define-type state (tuple bset bset brel brel brel brel brel brel brel brel))
Predicate transmit-to-list-precondition implements the guard of transmitto-list in Table 3 . Notice that operation transmit-to-list extends operation transmit (see Table 2 ), so transmit-to-list-precondition actually implements the conjunction of the guards of both operations. An expression such as (pages s) returns the machine variable pages, where s is the event prestate, (policies s) returns the privacy policies, etc.
(define transmit-to-list-precondition :: (-> state int bset int bool) (lambda(s::state c::int prs::bset l::int) (and (bset-is-member (contents s) c) (bset-is-subset prs (persons s)) (not (bset-is-subset (brel-apply (owner s) c) prs)) (bset-is-member (brel-get-domain (listow s)) l) (bset-is-equal (brel-apply (listpe s) l) prs) (bset-is-equal (brel-apply (owner s) c) (brel-apply (listow s) l)))))
Function transmit-to-list makes some content available to a list of users. Each person in prs is given view permission on the transmitted content c, which is also added to their pages. The function returns the state after modifying the page contents and the view permission on the new content. Notice that according to the transmit-to-list-precondition the lists prs and lst are the same.
(define transmit-to-list :: (-> state int bset int state) (lambda(s::state c::int prs::bset l::int) (mk-tuple (persons s) (contents s) (owner s) (brel-union (pages s) (brel-product-singleton-set c prs)) (brel-union (viewp s) (brel-product-singleton-set c prs)) (editp s) (listpe s) (listow s) (policies s) (disjointness s) )))
The Verification Condition Generator (VCGen)
Each use of an instruction within a privacy policy generates a verification condition (VC) that attests against the executability of that instruction. If the instruction is an operation, then the VC builds on the operation precondition, and hence the operation can only be executed if the VC can be discharged in Yices. For instance, it is possible to execute the transmit-to-list operation of NewPolicy in Section 3.2 only if the operation precondition holds. We have encoded a verification condition generator (VCGen) in Yices for discharging VCs. The VCGen generates a verification condition VC i for each instruction S i . VC i takes the form shown below, where p i is the pre-condition of S i and q i is its post-condition. The consolidated VC is the conjunction of each VC i , which is passed to Yices' SMT solver to check for satisfiability. Each VC i not only relates to the respective instruction S i but also to VC i+1 . The Expression S i -precondition is the precondition of operation S i . Events do not have an explicit notion for event postcondition, so expression S i -postcondition rather modifies the current state according to the event's implementation.
The approach for verifying privacy breaches in SNS presented in Section 3 permits users to compare two policies, an old and a new policy, for compliance. The new policy can stipulate that the user may share content with a list of users that is known to be a subset of the list of users specified by the old policy. The relation among social-networking variables (the lists) is therefore represented as a subset property over sets. This Yices subset property is combined (conjoined) with the VCs obtained for the translation of the policies and is then passed to the Yices solver. If the VCs and the Yices subset property are satisfiable then no privacy breach is produced.
During the process of verification of privacy breaches, the Yices solver generates a poststate of the privacy policy (the S i -postcondition expression). Then, we check whether the poststate privileges granted by the new policy is a subset of the poststate privileges granted by the old policy. More concretely, we check whether the access permissions after the execution of the new policy are a subset of the access permissions after the execution of the old policy. If this is the case, the new policy complies with the old policy.
A Verification Example in Yices
This section shows how privacy breaches are detected in Yices for the example presented in Section 3.1. We verify in Yices whether CommentPolicy complies with OriginalPolicy or not. The Yices code excerpt below is for CommentPolicy. Parameters of all the operations occurring within the policy are created at the beginning of the excerpt. A state is created for each operation, as well as an initial empty state and three VC boolean variables. All these VCs are asserted, and the satisfiability of the model is checked at the end of the code excerpt. Yices produces a valuation that makes the Yices model satisfiable, which indicates that all the operations contained within CommentPolicy can be executed one after the other.
(define c1::int) (define ow2::int) (define cmt::int) (define work::int) (define s0::state emptystate) (define s1::state) (define s2::state) (define s3::state) (define VC1::bool) (define VC2::bool) (define VC3::bool) ;;; (define p1::bool (create-account-precondition s0 c1 ow2)) (define q1::bool (= s1 (create-account s0 c1 ow2))) (assert (= VC1 (and p1 (=> p1 VC2)))) ;;; (define p2::bool (create-list-precondition s1 work ow2)) (define q2::bool (= s2 (create-list s1 work ow2))) (assert (= VC2 (and p2 (=> p2 VC3)))) ;;; (define coworkers::bset (brel-apply-to-elm (listpe s2) work)) (define p3::bool (comment-precondition s2 c1 cmt coworkers)) (define q3::bool (= s3 (comment s2 c1 cmt coworkers))) (assert (= VC3 (and p3 (=> p3 q3)))) ;;; (assert (and VC1 VC2 VC3)) (check) (show-model)
A second code excerpt is written for OriginalPolicy (not shown here) for which one should verify that all the operations in the policy can be executed too. Finally, one checks whether the NewPolicy complies with the OriginalPolicy through an (assert (bset-is-subset coworkers best-friends)) instruction.
Verifying Non-Interference
This section discusses a security model for the Event-B model for social networking introduced in Section 4. According to Event-B semantics, guards of two or more events can be evaluated concurrently, whereas only one event can execute (its actions, its critical section) at any given time. That is, events are atomic. However, in our logical model of SNS, a user might change the content or the content permissions of other users. For instance, a user may upload some content to their page, hence he becomes the owner of the content, and therefore he is granted view and edit permissions over that content. Thenceforth, the user can transmit (publish) that content to some other user's page, who will be granted view permission over the content. If the first user, the content owner, deletes the content from their page, it will also be from the page of the second user along with all the permissions associated to that content.
This section addresses the problem of the verification of the permission flow of "content owned" by users. Hence, we formulate here an appropriate security policy and discuss an example on how the proposed security policy can be verified. Our security policy builds on the non-interference principle introduced by Messenger et al. in [GM82] . Therefore, we verify that the set of permissions a user observe on their owned content after executing a sequence of operations (events) w is the same as the set of permissions they observe when the sequence is interleaved with operations executed by other users.
We formulate the security policy for a social network user u. We define [
We give in what follows the definition of
u based on the nature of the operation e. If the operation e is about creating a new user account, then the creator is granted view and edit permissions over the initial (page) content c. This operation affects u's observation only when u is the creator:
Only the person that uploads a fresh content can observe edit and view permissions over it:
When a person p hides a content c, p's permissions over that content are removed. Operation hide requires person p not to be the owner of content c, otherwise, hide would need to remove view and edit permissions to any other user having access to that content.
The make-visible operation does not affect any permissions: it requires the user to have view permission on the content, and, if so, it adds the content to the user's page content.
Person u observes a new view permission over content c for some set of persons prs to whom user u is transmitting. User u owns content c, meaning u has view and edit permissions over c. Only view (and not edit ) permissions are transmitted to other users.
Transmitting to a list l of users is similar to the previous operation. User u only observes changes when he owns both the content and the list, where listow returns the owner of a list and listpe returns the persons that are part of a particular list.
Restricted transmission to a list of persons l 2 is similar to the transmission to the list of persons l 1 , but only the restricted set of persons l 1 observe the change in the view permissions:
When user u deletes a content c and a set of contents cts, he observes there is no longer view or edit permissions over those contents for every person that had them. We use the relational domain subtraction operation ⊳ − of Event-B (see Table 4 in Section 5) to represent deleting from u's observations those permissions.
Posting a comment of a content c that is to be seen by a set of persons prs changes u's observations when u is the owner of c. The change amounts to observing new view and edit permissions over the comment for each person in the set prs and also for u:
When a content c owned by u is edited by changing it into some fresh content newc, u observes deletion of all permissions people had over c and addition of those same permissions over newc. The set of persons that had view permission over c is computed by using the relational evaluation
. Only u, the owner of content c, is given edit permission over content newc, and since he has view permission over that content too, he becomes its owner.
When user p edits a content c owned by u p, what u observes is that p and, in general, any other user with that page content, looses permissions over c and gains them over the new content newc. Editing a non-owned content c works out by using newc to replace for c everywhere except in u's page. User p becomes the owner of newc, hence gaining view and edit permission over it. User u does not gain or loose any permission.
When u grants p view permissions over some contents c, he observes the addition of that permission, and similarly for edit permission: 
A Security Verification Example
As an example of how one can prove the satisfaction of the security policy we present the following case. Let us assume the following operations within the SNS. A user a first uploads some content c a to the network. Therefore, a becomes the owner of c a . Next, user a transmits c a to user b. User b then comments on content c a . We must, therefore, prove that the action performed by user b has no effect on the privileges (permissions) that user a has over their content c a .
The initial sequence of operations observed by a is the following:
The first operation, e 0 , to occur is upload. As per the definition above, The second operation to occur, e 1 , is transmit. As per the definition above,
where sequence x 1 = transmit.x 0 , under the assumption b a ∧ b ∈ prs ∧ a prs
The third operation to occur, e 2 , is comment. User b comments on content item c a , which a owns. The comment cmt is owned by b. And, b belongs to the list prs of receivers as for the previous assumption. As per the definition above,
where sequence x 2 = comment.x 1 , under the assumption owner(cmt) = b.
Then, we take sequence x 2 and purge the operations that b owns, that is, we purge the operations performed by b. In our example the action to be purged is commenting on content c a , that is, operation e 2 . As per the definition above,
and therefore user b interferes with user a.
Notice that one needs to check that each operation in x 2 is executable (following Section 6) before checking for non-interference. Also notice that small changes in the definition of the SNS operations may produce different results for the verification of non-interference. The definition of operation comment allows anyone in prs to comment on content c. List prs may be the list of best-friends of owner(c), or any other list of receivers. Every and each member of prs is given edit permission over cmt. That is, not only the owner of the comment but also owner(c) and any other member of prs can delete cmt. This modeled behavior does not match the behavior of a SNS like Facebook in which only the owner of the comment can delete it or edit it. In the definition of purging a comment, we could have opted for having only owner(c) to be the owner of the operation and not any of the members of prs. This would have made the user b not to interfere with the user a.
Related Work
IBM's Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) [BBKS03] and the OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [Mos05] are definition languages for privacy policies. They define rules that specify the condition under which an entity can be granted access to some data. These conditions are specified over a specific attribute using functions over values. The rules and conditions must also contain a description of which rule or policy applies to a specific request. This format of policy specification raises problems in the context of SNS as it is too restrictive, requiring the specification of rules relating each user to each content and they do not provide the flexibility for specifying multiple generalizable policies.
In [Dan09] , George Danezis proposes the definition of a framework for privacy policies inference based on the user's social context. The framework uses an approach based on graph theory and machine learning that draws context from previous actions performed within the social network. It aims to infer what a user's policy might be based on the context of its actions. This form of inferring privacy policies was found to be easy for users as it automates the process of publishing content. However, it leaves the user exposed to privacy breaches as he has less control over who his content is accessible to.
In [DDLS01], the authors present a privacy policy definition mechanism based on role based access control called RBAC [FSG + 01]. In such a mechanism various users are designated to serve specific roles within the system. Privileges over content are granted to a user based on their role. Content in turn must carry with it a privacy policy defining access criteria, that is, what roles a user might be granted access content. Such a mechanism is found to be too restrictive for social network privacy policies as users don't usually adopt specific roles, rather roles are in a constant state of change, with users sharing or hiding content as they choose. Additionally, the approach presented in [DDLS01], requires certain users to adopt a managerial role to oversee content sharing. Our policy definitions do not require this level of user commitment and have the flexibility to define policies as and when a user chooses.
In [BCCB + 07], Julien Brunel et. al., incorporate the above approaches in defining a formal policy specification language and contextual awareness for policy definition. They define access control as a set of rules allowing a user to gain access through the Information System. The policy is dependent on the subject performing the action and on what they are accessing. Contextual permissions depend on the system environment at the time of the action, that is, their framework associates the access-privilege conditions that must be satisfied according to the system state. The mechanisms for user access control and policy generation based on context are designed for information systems wherein access to content is granted based on rules defined within the system. These rules are defined based on criteria such a user's clearance level. Based on these rules when a user attempts to access some content item the rules associated with the content are checked and if satisfied the system will allow the access. This differs from social networks as the user is not attempting to access some content, rather a set of content is shared with them. Therefore based on the rules/ privacy policy content is shared with some users. The difference in the approach presented by the authors and our approach is in their application. Julien Brunel et. al. apply policy definition within information systems wherein all the context is selfcontained. Within online social networks a lot of context might not be contained within the system but rather in the offline world.
In [SHC + 09,SG04] Norman Sadeh et. al. present several frameworks to deal with privacy concerns when using location aware services. These frameworks rely on various anonymization techniques. These techniques have shown great success in location-based social networking services. But as they primarily rely on altering the content the user is sharing, they are not suitable as a generalized approach towards policy definition.
The Mobius PCC (Proof Carrying Code) infrastructure [BCG + 07] draws heavily from the foundational PCC [App01] approach, so it avoids any commitment to a particular type system and the use of a verification condition (VC) generator. In foundational PCC, the code provider must give both the executable code plus a proof in the foundational logic that the code satisfies the consumer's safety policy. Foundation proof carrying code generates VCs directly from the operational semantics so making the proofs more complicated to produce. We target social network applications and generate VCs, based on WP calculus, in a similar way as they are generated in foundational PCC.
Lissom is a source level PCC platform [GMdSP06] that outputs VCs into the Why toolset [CM09] and the Coq proof assistant [INR06] . We generate VCs directly from source code too, and initially considered Why to discharge VCs, but then opted for the Yices prover. P3P, the Platform for Privacy Preferences (http://www.w3.org/P3P/), an effort of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), encompasses a standard XML mark-up language for expressing privacy policies so as to enable user agent tools (e.g. Web browsers, electronic wallets, mobile phones, stand-alone applications, or social network applications) to read them and take appropriate actions. A P3P Policy is primarily a set of boolean answers to multiple-choice questions about name and contact information, the kind of access that is provided, the kind of data collected, the way the collected data will be used, and whether the data will be shared with third parties or not. Though P3P policies are precisely scoped [CL02] , they are not expressive enough to model general privacy properties on content. They are not based on mathematical formalisms either, e.g., predicate calculus, so that it is not possible to reason about the truths derivable from policies expressed in P3P standard language.
In [BSS08], N. Sadeh et al. develop a theory that relates expressiveness and efficiency in a domain-independent manner. Authors derive an upper bound on the expected efficiency of a given mechanism. The expected efficiency depends on the mechanism's expressiveness only. Using predicate calculus to write users' privacy policies on content improves the expressiveness of mechanisms modeling policies. We plan to build on Sadeh et al.'s work to study how this higher expressiveness of predicate calculus based privacy policies comes down to a higher efficiency of the agent mechanisms allowing social-network users to set their privacy preferences.
Conclusion and Future Work
With the ever-growing complexity of social network relationships and the way social networking sites link and share content, mechanisms to identify potential privacy and security breaches are crucial. Privacy breaches due to transitivity permission-delegation threats can very often be unintentional. Providing social network users with feedback on the consequences of their actions can help mitigate such transitivity based privacy breaches. This paper presents a formal methods framework for dealing with privacy threats in SNS. We model the behavior of SNS in Logic and use the Rodin platform to sanitize our model by checking the adherence of the SN operations against the safety properties of the model. By performing this checking in Rodin we avoid having to perform a similar checking in Yices, which ultimately will negatively affect our future work, which is described below.
As future work, we plan to extend our verification framework for use in Facebook. The extension can be implemented over two axis. Over a first axis, the checking of privacy breaches can be implemented as a Facebook plug-in that performs the verification on-the-fly each time (before) a user wants to update his privacy settings. The plug-in would inform the user whether any violation is produced. Over a second axis, a (second) plug-in would inform a user if a new feature, game, or an additional functionality would break his privacy policy. This plug-in can be implemented using Proof-Carrying-Code (PCC) techniques [Nec97] . PCC is a mechanism to check if a host system (the code consumer) can safely execute a third-party application (produced by the code producer) so that it does not violate a safety policy that constitutes a well-definedness property of the host system. With PCC, the code producer is required to provide the thirdparty application (the Facebook plug-in) and a safety proof (a certificate) that attests to the safety property. The code consumer (the Facebook user account) validates the proof by running it and hence checking if it can safely run the third-party application. The safety policy is composed of two parts, a set of safety rules and an interface. The safety rules are a set of operations (made available by the host system) and its preconditions. The interface is a set of invariants that the third-party application must establish before calling any of the operations provided by the host system. As for our work, the safety rules are the operations presented in Section 5.2, and the interface is formed of the invariant properties presented at the beginning of Section 4. In short, we believe that our work might lead to the development of new back-end systems that can help users understand their decisions.
